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1  Research for this paper was supported by the European Commission FP6 "Structuring the European 
Research Area" Marie Curie Chair and KnowNet project. Primarily, the research method for this paper 
is ‘participant observation’ in events, activities or organisations deploying the ‘bridge’ (or other 
‘linking’ and ‘boundary drawing’) metaphors including:  
• Global Development Network (www.gdnet.org) conference: “Bridging Research and 
Knowledge” in 1999, and as a Steering Committee member of its on-going global 
research project called “Bridging Research and Policy”; 
• RAND ‘Linking think tanks’ conference May 2005; 
• Center for Policy Studies (www.ceu.hu/cps) research program on ‘bridging research and 
policy’ and PASOS network; 
• Overseas Development Institute’s ‘Research and Policy in Development’ 
(www.odi.org.uk/RAPID) program since 2002;  
• Annual conference of the UK Development Studies Association “Bridging Research and 
Policy’, November 2004; 
• Evian Group Capacity Building workshop, September 2005.  
Observations were supplemented by secondary material in the surveys listed in the bibliography. Other 
primary information comes from the web-sites of many more institutes than identified in the paper. 
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Abstract 
 
The phrase ‘think tank’ has become ubiquitous – overworked and underspecified – in the 
political lexicon. It is entrenched in scholarly discussions of public policy as well as in the 
‘policy wonk’ of journalists, lobbyists and spin-doctors. This does not mean that there is an 
agreed definition of think tank or consensual understanding of their roles and functions. 
Nevertheless, the majority of organisations with this label undertake policy research of some 
kind. The idea of think tanks as a research communication ‘bridge’ presupposes that there are 
discernible boundaries between (social) science and policy.  This paper will investigate some 
of these boundaries.  The frontiers are not only organisational and legal. The boundaries also 
exist in how the ‘public interest’ is conceived by these bodies and their financiers. Moreover, 
the social interactions and exchanges involved in ‘bridging’ muddy the conception of 
‘boundary’ allowing for analysis to go beyond the dualism imposed in seeing science on one 
side of the bridge, and the state on the other, to address the complex relations between experts 
and public policy.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: discourse; expertise, knowledge networks; policy entrepreneurs, think tanks. 
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Introduction 
 
Think tanks – organizations engaged on a regular basis in research and 
advocacy on any matter related to public policy.  They are the bridge between 
knowledge and power in modern democracies” (UNDP, 2003: 6).   
The UNDP definition captures the sense in which think tanks are an intermediary or 
interlocutor between knowledge and power, science and the state. UNDP’s choice of metaphor 
is not unique. As a simple google search will demonstrate, the discourse ‘bridging’, ‘linking’ 
or ‘connecting’ the policy and research worlds reverberates throughout the web-sites, mission 
statements and publications of think tanks. 
 
The idea of think tanks as a ‘bridge’ presupposes that there are discernible boundaries between 
(social) science and policy (Halfmann & Hoppe, 2004).  This paper will investigate some of 
these boundaries.  The frontiers are not only organisational and legal. The boundaries also 
exist in how the ‘public interest’ is conceived and enacted by these bodies and their financiers.   
Moreover, the social interactions and exchanges involved in ‘bridging’ muddy the conception 
of ‘boundary’ allowing for analysis to go beyond the dualism imposed in seeing science on 
one side of the bridge, and the state on the other, to address the complex relations between 
experts and public policy.  
 
More prosaically referred to as policy ‘institute’ or ‘centre’ – Anglo American definitions of 
think tanks have prevailed in the scholarly literature. Such definitions are reflective of the 
socio-political context in which think tanks were first constituted. That is, advanced liberal 
democracies that allowed ‘thinking space’ for independent policy research. As think tanks 
proliferated around the world, traditional definitions have been stretched beyond original 
meaning and US-style taxonomies have lost their relevance. Nevertheless, the persistence of 
such definitions in the face of comprehensive change in the think tank modality over time, has 
contributed to out-dated assumptions and myth-making about their role in society and politics.  
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Three sets of assumptions about think tanks structure this paper. These conventional beliefs of 
the roles and activities of think tanks will be referred to as ‘three myths’. They are:  
1. Think Tanks are Bridges  
2. Think Tanks Serve the Public Interest 
3. Think Tanks Think 
Firstly, this paper will cast doubts over perspectives that there is something organisationally 
specific about think tank research that sets them apart from universities, consulting firms and 
NGOs. Where it was once possible to conflate research brokerage function with organisation, 
this is less apparent; convergence is occurring.  The international spread of the think tank 
model alongside the forces of democratisation in Latin America, the industrial surgence of 
Asia, the transition of the former Soviet Union (fSU), central and eastern Europe (CEE), and 
the professionalisation of African elites, has lead to many hybrid forms of think tank.   
 
Secondly, think tanks are usually portrayed as acting in the public interest, stimulating public 
debate, educating the citizenry, undertaking research for the rational improvement of policy 
making, contributing to more effective governance through policy analysis, as well as being a 
conduit for public participation and force for democratic consolidation.  Thirdly, think tanks 
present themselves, and are represented by the media, as scientific establishments, composed 
of experts and scholars engaged in the task of thinking, writing and publishing.  
 
These three discourses are broadcast by think tanks (via annual reports, mission statements 
and web-sites) to legitimate their activities.  These discourses are also repeated by the various 
interests that fund think tanks and who often need to legitimate their funding decisions on the 
grounds that think tanks ‘bridge research and policy’, ‘serve the public interest’ or ‘build 
knowledge’. However, think tanks engage in many activities that substantially diminish the 
validity of these discourses.  Nevertheless, the ‘myths’ persist due to the social and political 
utility of such metaphors  (Smith, 1991: 14).   
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Myth One: Think tanks are bridges between state, society and science 
 
Five decades ago, there used to be a straightforward response to a question asking what is a 
‘think tank’. They were independent, non-profit research institutes with a policy orientation.  
When think tanks were first established – mostly after world war one – they were concentrated 
in the USA, the UK and its dominions, notably Canada and Australia. Of this era, the sister 
institutes of international affairs in the British dominions deserve mention.  In the US, bodies 
such as the Brookings Institution, the Russell Sage Foundation and the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR) are among the most notable (Smith 1991).   
 
Yet, the term ‘think tank’ originated later during World War Two. It was used to describe 
secure and ‘sealed environments’ for expert strategists pre-occupied with military planning,  
like the RAND Corporation. By the 1960s, the term was entrenched in the Anglo-American 
lexicon of policy analysis and was being applied to independent research institutes throughout 
the English speaking world. Consequently, social science characterisation of think tanks has 
been shaped by Anglo-American experience  (inter alia, Weaver 1989, Smith 1991, Stone 
1996). The dominance of Anglo-American perspectives of what constitutes a think tank 
clouds the very great diversity and hybrid forms of think tank that emerged by the end of the 
second millennium.  
 
The type of constitutional architecture, historical circumstances of war or stability, the 
political culture and legal traditions alongside the character of the regime in power, determine 
the shape and extent of think tank development in a country. Consequently, ‘think tank’ defies 
exact definition. They vary considerably in size, legal form, policy ambit, longevity, 
organisational structure, standard of inquiry and political significance. There is scholarly 
difference over how to identify these organisations, symptomatic in the competing typologies 
(Abelson, 2006; Boucher, 2004; Ladi, 2006) that often do not keep pace with the evolving 
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think tank form. Moreover, the directors of these organisations – such as at the Aspen Institute 
– often make fine distinctions between ‘research institute’ and ‘think tank’. Usually, such 
disputes revolve around the role of advocacy and organisational capacity for quality policy 
research with think tanks deemed to do the former and institutes the latter. 
 
Some organisations claim to adopt a 'scientific' or technical approach to social and economic 
problems. Others are overtly partisan or ideologically motivated. While some institutes are 
routinely engaged in intellectual brokerage and the marketing of ideas whether in simplified 
policy relevant form or in sound bites for the media, others are more academic. Many 
institutes are disciplinary based – economic policy think tanks, foreign policy institutes, social 
policy units, etc. Specialisation is contemporary phenomenon. There are environmental think 
tanks, regionally focussed operations and those that reflect the communal interests of ethnic 
groups. While most display a high level of social scientific expertise or familiarity with 
governmental structures and policy processes, there is considerable diversity in style and 
output of think tanks.  The scholarly 'ink tank' can be poised against the activist 'think-and-do 
tank'. That is, differences between think tanks that are analytical and geared towards 
publication of books and reports compared to think tanks that are more activist. Accordingly, 
the styles and methods of ‘bridging’ knowledge and power are numerous.   
 
Today, ‘think tank’ is a very elastic term. Furthermore, the international use of the term differs 
dramatically.  It has been applied to NGOs that have research arm – for instance, Oxfam or 
Transparency International.  The term has also been applied regularly to the OECD, as well as 
to government research bureaux and units attached to political parties. Organisations that once 
would not have been thought of as think tanks are now all too ready to adopt the label. 
 
Ostensibly, the think tank label has caché.  That so many groups around the world wish to cast 
themselves as ‘think tanks’ is symbolic of the effectiveness of the label and using it as a 
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designation for approaching international donors and philanthropic foundations. The brand 
name has been so widely used its meaning is becoming opaque.  
 
Competition and Convergence 
Part of the confusion that arises over the term results from the increasingly diverse sources of 
policy analytic competition to think tanks. Much of the literature on think tanks has suggested 
that there are organisational features of think tanks that set them apart from universities and 
NGOs (Weaver, 1989; McGann & Weaver, 2000, Smith, 1991). However, where it was once 
possible to conflate science-state bridging function with the think tank form, convergence with 
other organisations makes this a matter of contention.  
 
• Interest Groups: Interest groups are usually portrayed as promoting an interest that is 
sectional or promotional in an advocacy oriented manner. By contrast think tanks have 
been portrayed as engaged in independent research. They attempt to either influence or 
inform policy through intellectual argument and analysis rather than direct lobbying. They 
are engaged in the intellectual analysis of policy issues and are concerned with the ideas 
and concepts that underpin policy. However, bodies like Greenpeace, Transparency 
International and Oxfam have created their own sophisticated research centres. The policy 
analysis conducted by bodies such these is not greatly different from what might be done 
in a think tank like the Brookings Institution. There is a long term trend of 
professionalisation in NGOs, one aspect of which is building policy research capacity. 
 
• Professional Associations: These bodies can draw upon the skills and expertise of their 
membership. For example, both the Public Management and Policy Association (PMPA) 
in the UK and the association of Public Policy and Management (APPAM) in the USA 
draw together managers and policy makers from different disciplines across the public 
services. The associations provide forums in which they can discuss public policy and 
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management issues. PMPA addresses the "big issues that affect the public services as a 
whole" (www.cipfa.org.uk/aims) with services, workshops, publications.   
 
• Consultants and commercial firms: Increasingly, accounting firms, investment banks, law 
firms, bond rating agencies and stock analysts perform a powerful independent role 
monitoring firms and enforcing regulatory standards (Shinn and Gourevitch, 2002: 27). 
Acting as ‘reputational intermediaries’ the big accounting firms undertake independent 
audit and provide objective advice to shareholders.  Similarly, in training and dialogue 
activities think tanks face competition from commercial consultants, from multinational 
corporations and especially from the financial sector. With the advent of the ‘new public 
management’ (NPM), consultancy companies have acquired a high profile in the transport 
of policy ideas, management principles and social reforms from one context to another 
(Bakvis 1997). Privatisation, down-sizing and out-sourcing, as well as the move towards 
market economies in the former soviet states gave large consulting firms – such as 
Coopers & Lybrand, KPMG Peat Marwick or Accensure – several reasons to establish 
'government consulting divisions' in their organisations. They are producing policy 
relevant analysis, liaising with public servants and advocating the adoption of  'a more 
managerial approach in government' (Saint-Martin, 2000).  
 
• University Institutes: Some think tanks have been described as 'universities without 
students' (Weaver, 1989: 564). While the relationship between think tanks and universities 
has been close in most political systems, important differences are usually observed. Think 
tanks are not normally degree granting institutions. There are a few exceptions, notably 
RAND in the USA and FLACSO in Latin America. However, the increasing growth of 
policy focused university institutes represent a real source of competition to think tanks. 
The social sciences in particular have adapted.  University research centres like the 
Institute for Development Studies at Sussex, the Constitution Unit at UCL, the Centre for 
Economic Performance and the Social Exclusion Unit at LSE do academic work. 
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However, they also do think tank things—policy briefings, networking, consultancy, 
government advising etc—bridging the academic and policy realms. 
 
The blurring of boundaries and the overlap of objectives and activities means that traditional 
‘think tanks’ are losing some of their organisational distinctiveness (Boucher, 2004: 97). 
Think tanks are competing for staff as well as for official patronage and funding from new 
actors in their field. The media and the World Wide Web mean that the general public as well 
as the politician can find policy analysis more readily.  However, the dual dynamic of 
competition and convergence is not the only set of developments that is destabilising 
contemporary understandings of ‘think tank’. It is necessary to understand how think tanks 
spread internationally conceptually stretching the term ‘think tank’.  
 
The International Spread and Stretching of Think Tanks 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, think tanks proliferated dramatically.  
Countries where think tanks were already present such as the USA, Britain, Sweden, Canada, 
Japan, Austria and Germany witnessed further organisational growth. In these countries, 
increased competition in the think tank industry often encouraged policy advocacy and the 
politicisation of institutes, most particularly in the USA. The Heritage Foundation is usually 
cited as the exemplar but so-called New Right think tanks can be found in many countries 
(Denham & Garnett, 2004).  The Nordic and Austrian accession to the EU, and the growth of 
the legislative power of the Commission, prompted a spurt of new think tank development 
throughout Europe, especially in Brussels (Boucher et al, 2004: 20). 
 
Democratic consolidation, economic development and greater prospects of political stability 
in Latin America and Asia provided fertile conditions for think tank development. The demise 
of the Soviet Union also opened political spaces for policy entrepreneurs. The global think 
tank boom has been fuelled by corporations and other non-state actors demanding high quality 
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research, policy analysis and ideological argumentation as well as by governments as they 
developed in size and capacity.  
 
Think tanks have been exported to nation-states via development assistance from governments 
and international organisations seeking to extend policy analytic capacities, aid civil society 
development or promote human capital development. For instance, the UNDP regional office 
in Bratislava held a think tank capacity building conference in 2003 to help improve the 
quality of governance in central and south eastern Europe. USAID, the World Bank, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung and Freedom House, amongst many others, have convened similar 
activities. For instance, the existence of the Lithuanian Banking, Insurance and Finance 
Institute, has been explained as the consequence of ‘foreign institutions (that) looked for 
partners to work with’ and ‘if they did not exist, encouraged their creation’ (Chandler and 
Kvedaras, 2004). On the other hand, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Office of the High 
Representative undertakes many state functions and is the main source of demand for policy 
analysis.  Thus policy analysis has tended to come from outside rather than from local 
organisations. The presence of numerous public and private donor organisations has seen the 
proliferation of many civil society capacity building bodies, but think tank-like organisations 
more often resemble consultancy firms (Miller & Struyk, 2004). A similar situation prevails in 
Serbia (Andjelkovic, 2003) and Slovakia (Boucher et al, 2004: 24).  The think tank concept 
has been exported around the world and the term ‘think tank’ has been adopted in its English 
wording, with all its cultural connotations.  However, it has been applied to hybrid 
organisations.  
 
The Western view that a think tank requires independence or autonomy from the state, 
corporate or other interests in order to be 'free-thinking' does not accord with experiences in 
other cultures. In many countries, the line between policy intellectuals and the state is blurred 
to such an extent that to talk of independence as a defining characteristic of think tanks makes 
little sense. Many organisations now called ‘think tanks’ operate inside government. This is 
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evident in countries such as the People’s Republic of China. Some institutes have been 
incubated in government and subsequently made independent. It is not unusual to find 
institutes with political patrons or formal links to political parties, as in Malaysia. Many of the 
German foundations, for instance, have been established by political parties or have strong 
ties to the Lander. Elsewhere, research institutes are attached to corporations as is evident in 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Notwithstanding funding dependence or political affiliation, 
high-quality research and technical analysis along with critical advice can be feasible within 
these political contexts. However, such developments destabilise the discourse of think tanks 
located ‘in-between’ the domains of knowledge and power.  
 
Nevertheless, other think tanks have found new spheres to do ‘bridging’ work. Beyond the 
nation-state, there are strong signs of think tank adaptation and evolution. International 
organisations such as the United Nations agencies, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have drawn think tanks in 
their ambit. Based in a business school, the Evian Group is in the policy orbit of the WTO but 
provides ‘intellectual ammunition’ as a business think tank to promote an open world 
economy.    
 
The European Union provides yet another institutional forum for think tank activity with the 
emergence of EU wide think tanks disengaged from specific national identities (Boucher et al, 
2004).  Furthermore, with the revolution in information and communication technology, the 
possibilities for policy research disconnected from specific organisational settings has become 
increasingly feasible and fashionable. Most think tanks have a virtual presence. It has also 
made international research exchange and collaboration between think tanks common place.  
Global and regional think tank networks have become extensive.  
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Networks as bridges 
While think tank networks are not new, over the past two decades the scale and density of 
networks has mounted significantly and extended from North American and European 
institutes to include a more globally diverse range of organisations. Networking ranges from 
the very informal, ad hoc, socialising or the ‘thin’ element of a virtual network through to 
formal international associations with a secretariat and large membership.  
 
International networks have coalesced around common areas of interest and policy themes as 
well as around ideology. A few examples will suffice.  The Institute for European 
Environmental Policy (IEEP) has offices in London and Brussels, is dedicated to the 
advancement of European environmental policies, and operates in a network with like minded 
institutes in Berlin and Madrid.  In contrast, the Atlas Foundation convenes free market 
institutes world wide providing start-up funds and technical assistance. Operating as a ‘think 
tank without walls’, the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), based in London, 
operates through a network of economists spread throughout Europe and North America with 
whom it contracts to produce policy studies. Since 1997 the Japan Center for International 
Exchange has convened the 'Global ThinkNet' meetings to promote policy-oriented dialogues.  
 
Think tank networks are particularly noticeable at the regional level, often reflecting shared 
historical conditions, ties of language and ethnicity, or of encountering similar trans-border 
policy problems.  For example, think tanks in the transition countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe have shared interests in privatisation and public sector reform.  The enormous growth 
in the number of think tanks in this part of the world has propelled think tank networking. 
PASOS was created in 2004 to institutionalise and regularise relations between the Open 
Society Institute funded network of think tanks in CEE and fSU and reflects the OSI turn from 
capacity building to policy research (Palley, 2002).  
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These networks have promoted the transnationalisation of policy analysis and scientific 
expertise. They create the over-lapping personal and communications infrastructure for fast 
transfer of new ideas and policy approaches between global and local domains. More 
importantly, networks have become a form of governance. The typical target of the think tank 
has been government.  However, in an age of privatisation, contracting-out, and the NPM 
alongside the growing importance of the private and voluntary sectors in the delivery of public 
goods and services, public-private partnerships de-centre policy dialogues. This is most 
pronounced at transnational levels among ‘global public policy networks’ (Reinicke, 2001). In 
the weakly institutionalised governance structures above the nation state, the science-policy 
boundaries are more fluid and constantly in negotiation. 
 
Returning to Myth One, the development of transnational research networks alongside the 
hybridisation of think tank styles with their international spread and the cross-pollination with 
other organisations developing policy research orientation has stretched the traditional idea of 
‘think tank’ as an organisational bridge between science and state.  Legal-organisational form 
no longer follows function. The label think tank is now applied to bodies as diverse as 
government research units attached to the executive, international organisations such as the 
OECD, or corporate research arms like Nomura Research Institute.  
 
Myth Two: Think Tanks Serve the Public  
 
The mission of the think tank is often to ‘serve the public interest’ and their role in society to 
“educate the community” with their policy analysis.   Indeed, many think tanks have legal 
status as charitable organisations and are obligated to pursue public objectives as ‘third sector’ 
organisations based in civil society. Echoes of publicly motivated aspirations can be found in 
the mission-statements or home pages of many think tanks. For example:  
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• The motto of the Federal Trust for Education and Research is 
“enlightening the debate on good governance” 
http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/); 
• The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, known as 
'Clingendael', promotes understanding of international affairs. The 
Institute acts in an advisory capacity to the government, parliament and 
social organisations (http://www.clingendael.nl/about/); 
• The Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Georgia “is committed to 
providing a forum for substantive dialogue between representatives of 
different branches of the government, the civil sector and the Georgian 
public” (http://www.ips.ge); 
• The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies indicates that its research is 
carried out “in the spirit of public interest” 
(http://www.eces.org.eg/About/Index2.asp?L1=1&L2=1).    
The examples are illustrative but are very common. Civil society institutes play a self-
proclaimed role in representing the public interest.  Rarely do think tanks seek to demonstrate 
that public debate has been ‘enlightened’ by their research. Instead, ‘enlightenment’ is 
presumed to ‘trickle down’ and have ‘atmospheric influence’ on the culture of debate.  
 
Some institutes do not express public objectives. The strategic focus is on policy communities 
and addressing ecision-making elites. For example:   
• The mission of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is to ‘inspire 
and inform policy and practice…’ (http://www.odi.org.uk/about.html)  
• IEEP seeks to ‘raise awareness’ of environmental issues and its “audience 
range from international and European institutions to local government, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), industry and others who 
contribute to the policy debate”. (http://www.ieep.org.uk/) 
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• For the Chr Michelsen Institute in Norway, public motivations run third in 
priority. “CMI research assists policy formulation, improves the basis for 
decision-making and promotes public debate on international 
development issues”  (http://www.cmi.no/about/index.cfm). 
Working to ‘promote understanding’ or ‘research in the public interest’ begs the question: 
Understanding for whom?  The language of engagement is one of a three-fold hierarchy.   
 
The ‘public realm’ is an ‘audience’ to which policy analysis is transmitted downwards – as a 
subject to be educated and wherein to raise awareness – rather than the public treated as a 
source of ideas and knowledge. In OECD countries people are used to seeing institute reports 
addressed in the quality press like Le Monde Diplomatique and the Economist, or a think tank 
expert debating topical matters on a news program. This route to the public (or the electorate) 
is in reality a one-way, top-down process, interpolated by the media. Relatively few think 
tanks have mechanisms for feed back from society.  Those that do might use devices such as 
e-discussions, focus groups, Open Days, meeting series and sometimes research partnerships 
with NGOs and community groups.  When practised, these are the deliberative elements of 
think tank activity emphasising discourses of public participation, the public accessibility of 
knowledge, the importance of experiential knowledge (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003).   
 
By contrast, the ‘policy community’ is the realm of the think tank where relatively horizontal 
relationships pertain. Think tanks interact with other stakeholders to policy issues – the media, 
NGOs, political parties, industry representatives and bureaucrats.  It is in these realms where 
think tanks play brokerage and gate-keeping roles that constantly redefine science/policy 
boundaries.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, think tanks operate more as supplicants towards decision-
makers and other actors in the political sphere, pushing ideas and analysis upwards into 
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decision making circles. This is particularly so in political systems characterised by high 
degree of state control such as Vietnam, Belarus or China.  
 
This is not to suggest that there is no interaction between institutes and the public. However, it 
is not a strong dynamic. Very few think tanks are membership organisations. It is unusual to 
see think tank officials representing their organisations in schools and colleges. A  high 
proportion are located in the central business district of the national capital. They rarely 
venture outside the national parallels to the Washington ‘beltway’ or the Parisian ‘boulevard 
pereriphique’. The organisational cultures of think tanks are not as open and accessible for the 
interested citizen as might be their web-sites. The elite venues, dress-codes, the jargon and 
scientific debates serve to keep the general public at bay and help to demarcate boundaries of 
the policy community.  Indeed, one role of certain think tanks can be to cordon public debate 
to safe sites of discussion where only those with mastery of policy and social scientific 
communication codes can participate; that is, the opposite of ‘bridging’. 
 
Interactions of international organisations with think tanks are a case in point. Think tanks are 
implicitly placed in the role of ‘gate-keepers’ to the UN, WTO or other international 
organisations, potentially becoming a barrier between NGOs seeking more direct access to UN 
personnel and procedures. In May 1999 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi 
Annan, convened a closed meeting to ask the assistance of think tanks in providing analyses to 
help guide UN policy making (ODC, 1999).  Think tanks were portrayed as organisations that 
could screen, channel and interpret NGO analysis and advocacy directed at the UN, and 
adjudicate between competing claims.  
 
Think tanks cater primarily to the economically and politically literate and are at some 
distance from the rest of society.  The people who found these institutes and who work in them 
are usually highly educated, male, middle-class, westernised professionals, often from 
privileged backgrounds. The organisational mandates – to inform and/or influence public 
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policy – drives them to engage with other usually more powerful elites in society. Those 
sponsored and funded by international organisations and donor groups tend to be well 
institutionalised, mainstream institutes whose research agendas concord in considerable degree 
with the policy interests of their funding source.  For example, the institutions at the core of 
the World Bank sponsored Global Development Network are mostly economic think tanks 
staffed by development economists (Bøås & McNeill, 2004). In other contexts, such as Serbia, 
it is apparent that donors and governments prefer to interact with think tanks and expert 
organisations as their civil society partners (Andjelkovic, 2003: 95).   As noted of Romanian 
think tanks in EU accession assistance programs:  
Though the intention of many such projects is to open up assistance 
programmes to non-state actors, these projects are often directed through 
official channels, even when the declared objective is the monitoring of the 
government by creating alternative expert capacity in the independent sector 
(Ionita, 2003: 144) 
NGOs may therefore view the ‘research community’ negatively: elite, exclusive and with 
insubstantial connections to the general public. 
 
Think Tanks and the Pursuit of Private Interests 
Rather than advocating the public interest, think tanks are also interested in firstly, empire 
building. This is most evident when winning grants or contracts becomes an end in itself. The 
corporate interest in expanding programmes, raising funds, publishing more books, securing 
media coverage and political patronage, and so forth are essential to organisational 
sustainability and growth, as well as the protection of jobs. The fund raising tread-mill and the 
day-to-day concerns of management are immediate pressures that compete with longer term, 
more intangible objectives to influence the climate of debate (Struyk, 2002). ‘Organisational 
insecurity, competitive pressures, and fiscal uncertainty’ are becoming increasingly common. 
In seeking to ‘reconcile material pressures with normative motivations’, think tanks ‘often 
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produce outcomes dramatically at odds with liberal expectations’ (Cooley and Ron, 2002). 
Market pressures increase the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour.   
 
Individual think tank staff can also be opportunistic, treating these organisations as vehicles 
for career development.  They are a training ground where political aspirants can practise their 
hand in policy issues, hone their rhetorical skills and induct themselves into policy 
communities.  An institute can later trade on the success of people such as David Miliband, 
currently a Minister in the UK Blair government and formerly director of IPPR.  Henry 
Kissinger was once a CFR scholar.  Think tanks produce human capital in the form of 
specialised analysts that often move between think tank, university and government service 
that can have long term ramifications indirectly interweaving the think tank with government 
agencies via its former fellows. The Adam Smith Institute says this clearly regarding its ‘Next 
Generation Group’ which:  
…serves as a meeting point for the next generation of leaders in business, 
academe, the professions, journalism and public policy 
(http://www.adamsmithinstitute.org/policy/tng.htm.)  
Similarly, the Evian Group has launched an ‘Open World Initiative’ of ‘young Evian’ 
associates.  
 
Think tanks need to trade on names and successful careers.  Attracting new talent is essential. 
It prevents them from becoming stale and opens an institute to new ideas and thinking.  
Consequently, attracting unseated politicians and bureaucrats works to promote the reputation 
of an institute whilst also providing a retirement post. Jacque Delors close association with 
Notre-Europe (www.notre-europe.asso.fr) dramatically raises the profile of this body.  
 
In short, think tanks have an interest in cultivating the policy careers of their fellows and 
providing an environment where such individuals can pursue their own interests.  In a few 
cases, the ‘vanity tank’ phenomenon crystallises the tendency where personal interest 
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outweighs public motivation. Otherwise known as ‘candidate tanks’, they rarely possess an 
extensive institutional infrastructure but are established to promote (aspirant) political leaders 
to lend political credibility to their political platforms (Abelson, 2006).  Most often found in 
the US, such institutes are not noted for their scientific protocols.  
 
The other danger that think tanks run, especially in liberal democracies characterised by a 
system of political appointment, is ‘hollowing out’ (Denham & Garnett, 2004: 242-43). Think 
tank personnel are obvious recruits to government.  ODI fellows are often ‘poached’ by 
OECD-DAC, the UK Department for International Development or the World Bank. Electoral 
turn over of governments can sap the strength of some think tanks should their staff be 
appointed as part of the new administration  (It is the so-called ‘revolving door’ phenomenon 
first noted in the US.) However, the politicisation of think tanks that usually comes with a 
close affinity with, and advocacy on behalf of, a particular administration or political party has 
been identified as having a more subtle and detrimental impact on the scientific integrity and 
scholarly credibility of think tanks.  In the words of two British observers: 
Recently the chief contribution of think tanks has been to foster the impression 
that power in Britain is concentrated within a charmed circle, where policy 
wonks rub shoulders with politicians and businesspeople in a kind of 
corporatism without the trade unions. …  The existence of people who have 
never worked outside the policy sphere … lends support to the impression of 
the increasing distance between government and the governed (Denham and 
Garnett, 2004: 243).  
A growing disjuncture between the public rhetoric of think tanks to promote an educated 
society in the face of the political apathy of the citizenry of many democracies throws into 
high relief the exclusivity of the policy communities in which think tanks prefer to circulate.  
 
Myth Three: Think Tanks Think 
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The general presumption is that think tanks house people who are engaged in thinking on the 
major and minor policy issues of the day; that is, they are ‘thinking outfits’. This myth of 
intellectual and scientific enterprise is an ‘idée fixe’.  
 
There is also the phenomenon of the ‘think-and-do tanks’. That is, institutes initiate and 
support the implementation or execution of community programs, policy trials, evaluation of 
programmes, monitoring and so forth. Some institutes also are engaged in ethics training, 
delivering in-service courses, producing TV documentaries, or capacity building. As noted 
earlier, organisational survival is a pre-eminent concern and one that takes resources away 
from ‘thinking’ or policy research towards marketing, advocacy and PR. Likewise, networking 
with other think tanks or within policy communities and global public policy networks is 
exacting upon the resources of think tanks.   
 
There are also different kinds of thinking, analysis, evaluation, informing policy endeavours.  
These are delineated as, i.) Recycling, editing and synthesis; ii.)  The policy entrepreneurship 
of ‘garbage cans’; and iii.) Scientific validation.  Working through these categories, the 
objective is to return to the question as to how think tanks “bridge” research and policy and 
negotiate the boundaries of knowledge and power.  
 
Recycling Bins 
Recycling ideas, synthesising ideas, re-interpreting scholarly work into a more accessible 
format is a valuable pursuit of benefit to busy bureaucrats and electorate conscious politicians.  
The daily pressures of governance generally mean that decision-makers function with a short 
attention span and rely upon their staff for the collection of relevant research and data. Think 
tanks strive to provide it for them.   
 
Much academic research that has policy relevance is not in a format suitable for government 
use. Think tanks are very effective organisations for translating dense ideas or abstract theory 
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into sound bites for the media; blue prints for decision-makers; and understandable pamphlets 
and publications for the educated public. Many academics disdain this kind of work, while 
universities and colleges do not provide the right institutional or career incentives to do it.  
 
Not only is it the recycling of ideas by think tanks, but also the re-cycling the experiences of 
practitioners (Abelson, 2006 chapter 5).  Think tanks are a vehicle to incorporate the 
perspectives of former military personnel, government officials or NGO leaders who would 
not easily qualify for appointment to a university. The recycling of professional experience is 
one of the more intangible modes of bridging.  Nevertheless, it enriches policy analysis and in 
the eyes of many decision makers enhances the credibility and likely practicality of think tank 
reports.  
 
Part of ‘recycling’ involves repetition.  The constant restatement of policy message via 
different formats and products – seminars, conferences, workshops, policy briefs, web-sites, 
books – broadcasts and amplifies policy research. While this might be considered as 
duplication, repetition is necessary to raise consciousness amongst the general public and the 
media.   
 
Think tanks also act as editors. International organisations and governments require 
knowledge organisations and reputable professionals to sift and vouch the welter of  
information and analysis pressed upon them by NGOs, other governments, corporations and 
others.   
… to understand the effect of free information on power, one must first 
understand the paradox of plenty.  A plenitude of information leads to a 
poverty of attention. Attention becomes a scare resource, and those who can 
distinguish valuable signals from white noise gain power. Editors, filters, 
interpreters and cue-givers become more in demand, and this is a source of 
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power. … Brand names and the ability to bestow an international seal of 
approval will become more important (Keohane & Nye, 1998: 89). 
Think tanks have a ‘brand name’ and symbolise legitimate and neutral vehicles to make sense 
of the conflicting evidence and information overload.  
 
Think tanks are recycling bins. This function is in different measure from one policy institute 
to the next.  However, the editing, synthesis and repetition of policy research and analysis is 
usually not sufficient to influence policy as a consequence of ‘trickling into’ policy 
communities. Instead, think tanks are far more strategic than simply acting as a bridge.  They 
have direct engagement with the policy process.   
 
 ‘Garbage Cans’? 
The ‘garbage can’ idea was formulated by Cohen, March and Olsen to argue that policy-
making was a chaotic and irrational process in contrast to some other theories of the policy 
process that portray more rational inputs of information into policy.  Indeed, the bridge 
metaphor implies linearity with think tanks editing or re-shaping knowledge in uni-directional 
movements from basic to applied science, from problem to solution, from abstract theorists to 
‘enlightened’ policy makers. 
 
In the garbage can model, decision-making is portrayed as a highly unpredictable and 
ambiguous process. Actors define goals and choose means as they go along. Organisations 
such as national ministries and executives do not have goals in the rational sense, but define 
them in the process of attaching problems to solutions.   In this perspective, think tanks can be 
thought of as: 
 … collections of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for 
decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues 
to which they might be an answer, and decision makers looking for work 
(Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972: 1) 
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In short, problems are constructed in order to justify solutions. Think tank solutions are on the 
look out for problems. Solutions chase problems.  Problems, issues and their solutions are all 
mixed.   
 
The ‘garbage can’ concept was modified by Kingdon (1995) where political decisions emerge 
from the interaction of three streams: political events, problem recognition and policy 
proposals.  The balance of importance between these three streams, and how they interact, 
varies from one policy setting to another. Within the US legislative context, these streams are 
largely independent of each other, each developing with its own dynamics and decisions.  
Notwithstanding the assumptions of a pluralist political context, it has been an important 
theory of agenda setting, with direct relevance to analysing the role of think tanks and their 
‘behind-the-scenes’ roles in policy.  
 
Elected or (self) appointed officials in the political stream are highly visible actors in agenda 
setting. By contrast, think tanks are less visible in the policy stream, but playing a significant 
role in (re-)formulating policy alternatives.  Since the agenda is always crowded and financial 
resources limited, as policy entrepreneurs they are critical in keeping policy proposals alive.   
 
Think tanks market policy ideas that have had long cultivation in the ‘garbage can’. Policy 
entrepreneurs in the think tank lift from their ‘garbage can’ policy recommendations, problem 
definitions, and explanations for policy dilemmas as new problems arise.  Think tank policy 
analysis often represents sets of solutions waiting for their ‘window of opportunity’. In 
conjunction with other ‘garbage cans’ they build coalitions of support via expert networks. In 
short, they channel the policy and political streams, to promote a convergence and seize 
opportunities (such as regime change, elections, policy crises) to change laws and policy.  It is 
more than re-drawing the boundaries between science and politics; it involves re-configuring 
the political landscape and manoeuvring the political and scientific actors upon it. 
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Policy entrepreneurship takes many diverse forms, and is both organisational and individual. 
There is no ‘recipe’ or ‘toolkit’ for training on policy entrepreneurship.  Instead, it rests on a 
delicate phroenetic blend of ‘softening-up’ actors in the political and policy stream through 
use of personal contacts, networking, media strategies and the creation of powerful policy 
narratives that simplify technical issues into manageable items of public policy. It is the 
management of expert discourse rather than research that empowers think tanks in agenda 
setting. Policy entrepreneurship is an important social practice in negotiating, sometimes 
negating, the boundaries between experts and decision makers. However, equally important is 
the scholarly credibility and intellectual authority of think tanks.   
 
Blinding us with science? 
It is usually the case that the best known think tanks do their own analysis.  They have been 
described as ‘idea factories’, ‘brain boxes’ (Boucher et al, 2004) or ‘thinking cells’ (McGann 
& Weaver, 2000). Thinking is a key function definitive of a think tank.  This means attracting 
top research staff.  The most successful institutes are those with staff who could as easily be 
found within academic circles. The authority of think tank has been cultivated and groomed 
through various management practices and intellectual activities.   
 
The knowledge credentials of think tanks scholars (PhDs; career profile in university or 
government research agency; service on blue ribbon commissions or expert advisory groups) 
bestows some credibility and status in policy debates that gives weight to their 
recommendations. However, neither knowledge production nor knowledge exchange is 
apolitical.  This may be obvious. Yet, a number of social practices give their product – ideas, 
publications, analysis – a patina of scientific objectivity and technocratic neutrality. 
Sophisticated computer modelling, positive economic theories or scientific papers published in 
refereed professional journals create ‘communication codes’ and protocols that construct some 
knowledges as more persuasive or reliable. Codified knowledge is not only expensive to 
reproduce but difficult to access. Practices such as peer review and professional accreditation 
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are exclusionary processes in which only those with the relevant credentials and mastery of 
protocols can participate.   
 
Issues of quality and rigour are paramount. The worst fate for a think tank is to be seen as 
delivering unreliable or sloppy analysis. With the emphasis on policy entrepreneurship and 
communication of easily digestible nuggets of policy information – in the form of policy 
briefs, media sound bites and power point pitches – the products of think tanks may 
oversimplify complex and technical issues. There is a tension in entrepreneurial demands for 
timeliness and informing the right people that can compromise the research process (Boucher 
et al, 2004: 22). In terms of management, think tank directors tend to stress academic style 
publications, rigorous methodologies and scientific peer review. It is supplemented by 
organisational strategies such as: creating an Academic Advisory Council; encouraging 
university sabbatical or teaching for think tank fellows; building post-doctoral programmes 
and fellowships; or hosting scholarly associations. A steadfast commitment to intellectual 
independence and scholarly enterprise bestows authority. Think tanks individually, and 
collectively, need to protect their social status as expert, research and analysis organisations.  
 
Think tanks do think. Furthermore, they can play an important role in setting the standard for 
policy research and independent analysis. Doing so, they help draw the boundary between the 
policy relevant ‘expert’ and the non-expert advocate. Indeed, think tanks are one 
organisational manifestation of this social boundary.   
 
Conclusion: Bridges or Barriers?  
 
Returning to the UNDP quoted at the beginning, think tanks have been portrayed as a bridge 
between knowledge and power. This image rests on conceptions of science and politics as 
being two essentially different fields of human endeavour. To portray think tanks as a ‘bridge’ 
is to maintain the distinctions and to invite a perception of these organisations as neutral 
 26 
publicly motivated intermediaries between the world of science and the separate world of 
politics and policy. This frequently occurring metaphor of think tanks as ‘bridges’ establishes 
a false ontological divide between theory and practice, between the ‘ivory tower’ and the so-
called ‘real world’ (Stone, 1996; 2003). The boundaries between the two domains remain 
unchanged but are linked by bridges such as think tanks that also play a role in both policing 
and mediating the boundaries.  
 
This paper argues that knowledge and policy is a mutually constituted nexus and that think 
tanks are not simple informants in transmitting research to policy. It is clear from previous 
studies that many think tanks help provide the conceptual language, the ruling paradigms, the 
empirical examples that then become the accepted assumptions for those making policy. Think 
tanks do not act alone in such intellectual action, but more usually in coalition with like-
minded thinkers in journalism, universities and so forth. Through their networks and policy 
communities, think tanks have ‘boundary transcending’ qualities (Krause Hansen et al, 2002: 
108) that allow them to act as mediators.  That is, they have the power and intellectual 
resources allowing them to do the work of articulation between the national, regional and 
global levels of governance. Mediation is required to manage the ideological operation of 
‘decoding’, interpreting and reformulating socio-economic realities. Far from standing 
between knowledge and power, think tanks are a manifestation of the knowledge/power nexus.  
In short, knowledge and policy are symbiotic and interdependent.   
 
These organisations also construct narratives, routines and standards concerning their own 
roles between science and the state or society. Recognition of think tanks as centres for expert, 
scientific and authoritative advice occurs because of the scholarly credentials of these 
organisations. It also happens because of the relationship with policy institutions and donor 
groups that have a vested interest in the ‘myth’ that think tanks think. Commissioning and 
funding studies, these interests want independent, rational, rigorous analysis that is associated 
with the brand name. Similarly, legitimation for supporting think tanks – and the willingness 
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of the media to use think tank experts – rests in the myth that they serve the public interest.  
More often than not, the think tank is represented as a neutral transmission belt of research, 
scientific ideas and policy analysis playing the appropriate ‘independent’ role of 
communication between state and society.   
 
The ontological division in the portrayal of think tanks continues to be perpetuated because it 
serves a purpose in policy discourses. The ‘myths’ and the metaphors have more public power, 
media resonance and policy attraction than does the more ‘messy’ modelling of ‘garbage cans’ 
or complex formulations of a knowledge-policy nexus. A diffuse and pervasive ‘nexus’ cannot 
be instrumentalised into a policy tool in the same way as a compelling but simplistic narrative 
can be built of think tanks ‘bridging’ or ‘linking’ the scholarly/political; the national/global; 
the state/society divides.    
 
Why do the myths persist? Science matters but so do interests. The myths persist because it is 
useful for governments and international organisations to sponsor so-called independent 
‘thinking outfits’ that represent one-way ‘bridges’ between them and the ‘public’.   
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